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T HE PAST QUARTER CENTURY has seen an outpouring of treaties regu, lating or prohibiting battlefield conduct. In the early to mid, 1970s, 
separate multilateral negotiations produced the Convention on the Prohibi, 
tion of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques l and Protocols F and IPAdditional to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 12, 1949. A subsequent conference produced the United Nations Con, 
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis, 
criminate Effects (UNCCW4) of October 10, 1980, and its three protocols.5 Ne, 
gotiation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction6 was completed in 1992, and the treaty was opened for signature 
onJanuary 13,1993. In 1994 the United Nations began preparatory sessions for 
the first review conference of the UNCCW, which concluded on May 6, 1996, 
with an amended land mines protocol and a new protocol prohibiting blinding 
laser weapons.7 Dissatisfied with the amended land mines protocol's regulation 
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and partial prohibition (rather than total prohibition) of antipersonnel land 
mines, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and the Government of Canada 
rushed through a conference that resulted in the Convention on the Prohibi, 
tion of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti, Personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction of September 18, 1997.8 On July 17, 1998, the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an Interna, 
tional Criminal Court produced the Rome Statute of the International Crimi, 
nal Court.9 A diplomatic conference was held in The Hague from March 15 to 
26, 1999 to promulgate a second protocol to the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 
1954.10 Planning already is underway for the second UNCCW review confer, 
ence, to be held not later than 2001, to consider the possibility of regulating or 
prohibiting other conventional weapons. 11 
The list of recent and possible future law of war legislation reflects a prodi, 
gious effort on the part of the international community. Equally impressive on 
its face is the number of States Parties to these and other law of war treaties. 
Whereas there are only thirty, four States Parties to the Hague Convention 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of October 18, 1907,I2 
and the Annex Thereto,13 there are 188 States Parties to the Geneva Conven, 
tions for the Protections of War Victims of August 12, 1949,14 and 156 States 
Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I. 
But the value of the law of war depends less on codification and ratification 
or accession of treaties than on effective implementation and observance. The 
urgency to create the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re, 
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com, 
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,15 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 and, subsequently, the Interna, 
tional Criminal Court, is clear evidence that codification and ratification or ac, 
cession mean little without effective implementation. Evidence of any 
implementation, much less effective implementation, by States Parties to Ad, 
ditional Protocols I and II, or the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention 
and its protocols, or even the older 1949 Geneva Conventions, is lacking and, 
for many States Parties, nonexistent. Although the Diplomatic Conference 
that promulgated Additional Protocol I concluded its work twenty, two years 
ago, there is little evidence of implementation of its obligations by States 
Parties, 17 and the treaty has yet to be tested by the harsh realities of combat. 18 
In 1999, some governments and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) were engaged in a futile headlong rush to create more law of war leg' 
islation in celebration of the centennial of the First Hague Peace Conference, 
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or the fiftieth anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The ICRC and 
other NOOs as well as some governments, flushed with their perceived suc' 
cesses in Ottawa and Rome, also are casting about to find other areas to legis, 
late in their effort to regulate or limit, if not entirely prohibit, the taking up of 
arms. 19 
The real success of recent efforts in Ottawa and Rome remains to be seen. 
As is true with cooking, the proof is in the eating rather than the making. The 
lessons of history offer some evidence of the probability of success. Govern, 
ments and NOOs would be well advised to examine those lessons heralding re, 
cent legislative "successes" or advocating new legislative ventures. 
Clear lessons are available from the between,the,wars endeavor by nations 
to prohibit or regulate submarine warfare. The product of nearly two decades' 
effort involving numerous conferences was a spectacular failure when con' 
fronted by the crucible of war. The legal history of the law of submarine warfare 
was reported in the late Professor W. T. Mallison's 1966 volume in the Naval 
War College's International Law Studies.2o Subsequent scholarship and exam' 
ination of the military, political, economic and diplomatic environment in 
which these negotiations occurred provides a more complete picture of that 
history. 
Regulating Submarine Warfare: A Preface 
Near,continuous negotiations between 1919 and 1936 produced a single 
document regulating submarine warfare. The 1936 Proces,Verbal Relating to 
the Rules of Submarine Warfare set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 
22 April 193021 declares: 
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law: 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to 
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether 
surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a 
merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew aJ1d ship's 
papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded 
as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in 
the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the 
presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board. 
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At the outset of World War II, forty,nine nations were States Parties.22 Yet 
the rules quickly proved a failure in that conflict. Each of the major naval pow, 
ers-Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States-will, 
ingly and systematically violated its provisions. While Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom moved steadily away from compliance, the departure ofJapan 
and the United States from compliance was instant and unhesitating. As will 
be shown, recent scholarship revealed that the U.S. decision was premeditated. 
Upon conclusion of that conflict, Germany's navalleadership23 was charged 
by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with waging unrestricted 
submarine warfare contrary to the London Naval Protocol. That tribunal ac, 
quitted each accused of the charge for Germany's attack of British armed mer' 
ch~nt ships, but found each guilty of violation of the protocol with respect to 
the attack of neutral merchant vessels by German U,boats and its rescue provi, 
sions. However, in light of evidence offered of similar conduct by British and 
U.S. submarines, the court awarded no punishment for these infractions.24 
This summary provides the framework for the analysis that follows: the re, 
jection by all principal State Parties of a treaty devised in the years immediately 
preceding the conflict, by (at least in theory) persons fully seized with the issue 
and the experience of a previous conflict to assist them in their negotiation 
efforts. 
Initial Regulation Efforts, 1899-1914 
Consideration of the possibility of regulation or prohibition of submarines 
began at the tum of the century. On August 24, 1898, acting on behalf of Tsar 
Nicholas II, Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Muraviev proposed the conven, 
ing of an international disarmament conference to address issues relating to 
disarmament, the proscription or regulation of certain modem weapons of war, 
and establishment of a mechanism for arbitration of international disputes.25 
Although other governments were suspicious of Russian motives, none felt 
that they could afford not to attend, and the First Peace Conference was con, 
vened in The Hague on May 18, 1899. Among its proposals, the Russian gov, 
ernment offered to abstain from submarine construction provided all other 
governments agreed.26 As was true of its rationale for calling the conference, 
Russia's motivation for its proposal was primarily economic; with a dread, 
nought construction race on, abolishing the new, unknown submarine would 
reduce naval acquisition costsP Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Ro, 
mania expressed a willingness to accept the Russian proposal if it were adopted 
by consensus. Other nations-Belgium, Greece, Persia, Siam, and 
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Bulgaria-favored a prohibition, but with reservations. Ten nations, including 
the United States, France, Austro,Hungary, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Nor, 
way, the Netherlands, and Turkey, strongly resisted the proposal, while Serbia, 
Switzerland and, ironically, Russia, abstained. Lacking unanimity, it failed.28 Of 
note is the fact that the proposal was introduced as an arms control rather than 
a law of war issue. Although "humanitarian" arguments were made in subse, 
quent conferences, the issue of controlling submarines remained primarily one 
of arms limitation, not the law of war. By 1907, more nations-including Rus, 
sia and Germany-had acquired submarines.29 As a consequence, neither the 
original Russian proposal nor any new proposal to regulate or prohibit subma, 
rines was offered at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Nor was the 
submarine the subject of special consideration in the subsequent London con, 
ference of major naval powers that produced the Declaration Concerning the 
Laws of Naval War}O 
This should not be surprising. In the pre,World War I era, the submarine 
was a relatively unknown but emerging capability. Nations were unwilling to 
surrender it unilaterally or prohibit it without universal agreement; most un, 
doubtedly preferred to take a wait,and,see attitude. By 1912, the world's major 
navies were building a substantial number of submarines}! Its anticipated role 
was seen primarily as scouting and support for the battle fleet}2 Limitations on 
employment of submarines in a visit and search role were recognized by 
then, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill who, in June 1913, ac, 
knowledged that the submarine "cannot capture the merchant ship; she has no 
spare hands to put a prize crew on board ... she cannot convoy her into har, 
bor. . . . There is nothing else the submarine can do except sink her cap, 
ture .... "33 The potential for use of submarines for attacks on commerce had 
been forecast. Six months prior to the beginning of World War I, Admiral of 
the Fleet Sir John Fisher advised the Prime Minister that Germany would likely 
employ her submarines for that purpose. As his biographer notes: 
The [Royal) Navy recognized the danger; and the only doubt was whether 
Germany, owing to the impossibility of differentiating between belligerent and 
neutral, would risk bringing neutrals into the war. Germany did what Fisher had 
forecasted; and in consequence, what others had foreseen also happened, 
namely, that the United States was drawn into the war.34 
British anticipation of probable German use of submarines was not met with 
a commensurate degree of preparation for antisubmarine warfare. Subsequent 
British conduct makes it probable, however, that having recognized the likely 
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outcome if a merchant ship carrying contraband was stopped by a German sub-
marine, the decision was taken that British merchant ships would actively re-
sist visit and search if attempted by a German submarine. 
German use of submarines in World War I would change naval warfare, but 
changes already were occurring in warfare that led to Germany's actions. The 
nation-State system had produced an environment in which a nation went to 
war with an enemy nation as a whole, rather than merely waging war against 
the enemy's military forces.35 Attacking a nation's ability to wage war included 
denying it seaborne commerce. The advent of the naval mine, submarine, and 
shore-based aircraft made close blockade difficult.36 Distant blockade became 
an alternative, and the submarine a viable force optio.n notwithstanding recog-
nized limitations on its use in that role. 
The story of Germany's use ofits submarines in World War I is well known.37 
Its employment of its submarines as commerce raiders virtually brought Great 
Britain to its knees. But its resort to unrestricted submarine warfare, which re-
sulted in the sinking of the British passenger ship Lusitania by U-20 on May 7, 
1915, with the loss of 1,198 passengers (twenty-eight Americans), and neutral 
vessels, was a major step in bringing the United States into the war on the side of 
the British and its allies.38 The end of World War I began an effort to prohibit or 
regulate submarine warfare that would continue for almost two decades. 
International Regulation Efforts, 1919-1936 
The conclusion of World War I raised two initial issues with respect to sub-
marine warfare: prosecution of German U-boat personnel for engagement in 
unrestricted submarine warfare, and disposition of the German U-boat fleet. 
With respect to the former, whether unrestricted submarine warfare was a 
crime for which U-boat commanders and crews could be held criminally re-
sponsible was debated quring the war.39 Allied demands at the end of the war 
for prosecution of Germans accused of war crimes, including U-boat personnel, 
proved only marginally successfu1.40 
The conduct of nations in World War I raised a legal issue in clear terms. Al-
though enemy and neutral merchant vessels historically have been regarded as 
noncombatants,41 the status of the former had been challenged by the new the-
ory of nation-State wars, and further complicated by distinctions made in dip-
lomatic correspondence during that conflict between public and private vessels 
of a belligerent, and the status of either when armed:42 in some cases manning 
their guns with military personnel; commissioning their captains as members of 
the Royal Naval Voluntary Reserve; directing them to report any sighting of a 
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U~boatj and ordering them not to subject their ships to visit and search, but in~ 
stead to ram and sink the challenging U~boat.43 Some belligerent merchant 
vessels were converted into heavily armed decoy ships, displaying false flags, 
known as "Q~ships." The decoy ship posed as a neutral merchant vessel until 
the unsuspecting U~boat approached, having ordered the merchant ship to 
stop to be searched. At the submarine's most vulnerable time, the Q:ship crew, 
members of the Royal Navy dressed in civilian clothing to disguise their true 
identity, would open fire with heavy guns from previously concealed posi--
tions.44 The issues had been identified, viz., (a) when does an enemy merchant 
ship forfeit its noncombatant status, and (b) what rules should apply to subma~ 
rines in light of the changes brought about by (a) ?45 Failure to address these 
critical issues in the post~ World War I series of multilateral negotiations was a 
primary cause for the subsequent failure of the 1936 Proces~Verbal regulating 
submarine warfare. 
The second issue was U~boat disposition. Germany surrendered its High 
Seas Fleet, including 176 U~boats. Another seven foundered en route to Great 
Britain. Ten older, unseaworthy U~boats and 149 boats under construction 
were broken up, and German submarine salvage vessels and docks were turned 
over to the Allied and Associated Powers.46 Their disposition could decide the 
future of submarine warfare. 
Paris Peace Conference. In anticipation of the Paris Peace negotiations, the 
American Naval Planning Section London considered the potential use of 
submarines. In a memorandum completed only days before the end of the war, 
its authors reached several conclusions with regard to the issues at hand and 
future use of submarines. The submarine, the authors asserted, "has an 
undoubted right to attack without warning an enemy man~of~war or any vessel 
engaged in military operations and not entitled to immunity as a hospital ship, 
cartel ship, etc."47 After recognizing the limitations of submarines in visit and 
search, and the "inherent right" of merchant ships to be armed, the authors 
stated that "Submarine operations in the present war may be considered to be 
typical of what may be expected in future wars, when success is dependent on 
the result of commerce. . . . It is interesting to note the several phases of 
submarine operations in the present war as illustrating the tendency to develop 
maximum efficiency regardless oflegal restrictions."48 
Continuing, the memorandum noted the success of German U~boat opera~ 
tions 'against Great Britain, "the greatest naval power as well as the greatest 
mercantile power in the world." It considered the value of submarines in a fu~ 
ture conflict to other naval powers, noting Japan's potential submarine threat 
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to U.S. lines of communications. The U.S. counter was that "our submarine 
bases on the Philippines and Guam would be within striking distance of her 
coasts and would be a great threat to the commerce on which her existence de, 
pends ... . "49Having recognized the military potential of the submarine as an ef, 
fective commerce raider, the memorandum took an ironic twist, recommend, 
ing the abolition of the submarine not for humanitarian reasons but because 
"our public opinion would never permit their use in the same manner as that of 
our adversaries."5o 
The memorandum was forwarded to Washington with an unfavorable en' 
dorsement by Admiral William S. Sims, Force Commander of American Naval 
Forces operating in European Waters, who stated that "The Force Commander 
does not consider that the arguments put forward by the Planning Section in 
this paper are logical, nor that they support the conclusions reached. The paper 
is therefore forwarded without approval for consideration by the Department 
[of the Navy]."51 Although the memorandum's recommendations were for 
naught, its value lies in its recognition of the potential and likely employment 
of the submarine in future conflicts. 
The issue would not be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference, as it was re, 
garded as beyond the scope of that conference and more in the purview of the 
League of Nations. The conferees ultimately distributed former German 
U,boats to France (ten), Japan (seven), and the United States (six). The re, 
maining U,boats were broken up.52 
The Paris Peace Conference exacerbated a growing naval rivalry between 
Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. Although allies during World War 
I, Japan and the United States previously had identified each other as potential 
foes in any future Pacific naval war; Great Britain joined in the assumption of 
war with Japan following World War J.53 Japan's receipt of the former German 
Pacific mandates (Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall groups, without providing 
a verification mechanism to ensure it kept its pledge not to fortify the islands) 
in the Paris Peace settlement, in part as a reward for its alliance against Ger, 
many, increased the concern of British,American navalleaders.54 It also was to 
be a factor in the American decision to resort to unrestricted submarine war, 
fare more than two decades later. 
In 1919, however, nations were engaged in the inevitable postwar retrench, 
ment of military forces. Great Britain's national debt had soared during the five 
years of World War I. Major cuts in government spending were paramount, 
and no costs were more apparent than naval shipbuilding. The issue was 
framed all the more by the beliefby many that the pre' World War I naval arms 
race was a major cause of that war. Against these beliefs was the genuine desire 
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by Great Britain that she retain her naval and mercantile supremacy upon the 
high seas, and the recognition that much of its pre,war fleet was reaching block 
obsolescence. The Royal Navy's dilemma was heightened by the changes in na, 
val construction made necessary by the submarine threat: hull blisters to pro, 
tect against torpedoes, more extensive internal subdivision within the ship into 
watertight compartments, higher speeds, and an increased need for antisubma, 
rine vessels.55 A call by u.s. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes on July 8, 
1921, for a conference on the limitation of armament to be held in Washing, 
ton, therefore, came as welcome news to Great Britain. A ban on submarines 
would eliminate a threat to its naval and mercantile supremacy while reducing 
its naval shipbuilding costs. The Washington Naval Conference, convened 
four months later, would provide Great Britain its first and best opportunity to 
prohibit the submarine as an instrument of war.56 With Germany theoretically 
(or at least temporarily) eliminated as a threat, Great Britain's budgetary and 
naval defense planning problems could be eased substantially by prohibition of 
one of the greatest threats to its naval and commercial shipping superiority. 
The three major naval powers (U.K., U.S. and Japan) shared a belief in the 
Mahanian doctrine of guerre d' excadre, which emphasized command of the seas 
through fleet engagements, rejecting the doctrine of guerre de course, or attacks 
on commerce.57 This philosophy drove the debate in negotiations between the 
wars and, in particular, British efforts to ab9lish the submarine. Those efforts 
failed in part because the belief in guerre d' excadre erroneously assumed that 
each future opponent would play to the opposite's strong suit, that is, the three 
major powers assumed that future enemies would choose to attack their oppo, 
nent where he was strongest rather than weakest. 
Washington Naval Conference. Submarines were an important issue at the 
Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, but not the most 
important.58 The meeting's primary purpose was to stop the capital ships arms 
race between the three major naval powers. The host nation opted to meet the 
issue head,on. In the opening plenary session on November 12, 1921, U.S. 
Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes proposed a tonnage ratio for capital 
ships for the three major naval powers that would require the scrapping of a 
large number of commissioned vessels and a stop,and,scrap program for new 
capital ships under construction. Hughes' ratio of 5:5:3 (U.S., Great Britain, 
and Japan, respectively) met with considerable resistance from Japan, which 
favored a 10: 10: 7 ratio, but ultimately accepted it with conditions.59 In return 
for Japan's agreement to this ratio, the United States and Great Britain could 
not fortify any of their respective territories within striking distance of] apan. 60 
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While the original U.S. proposal (5:5:3) considered only the naval arma, 
ment of the three principal naval powers, an effort to extend the formula to 
France and Italy in the course of the conference had an effect on the submarine 
issue. France balked at the formula proposed of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67,61 eventually 
accepting a 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 tonnage ratio provided it did not extend to auxil, 
iary vessels, such as cruisers, destroyers and submarines. This was the first of 
several ploys by the participating powers, and served to enable the submarine 
to evade prohibition-which France vehemently opposed-while introducing 
the alternative of use regulation. 
The British attempt to abolish the submarine, opposed by France, Japan, It, 
aly, and the United States, and offered against the advice of the American del, 
egation, had an overly optimistic goal and an ulterior motive. If Great Britain 
could achieve the abolition of the submarine, the threat would be removed. If it 
could not, it would use that fact to insist that the tonnage ratio not extend to 
cruisers, which it used not only in antisubmarine operations but also for most of 
its peacetime naval missions.62 Failing attainment of a submarine prohibition, a 
submarine tonnage ratio was proposed by the u.S. delegation. The British re, 
sisted, arguing that if a total prohibition could not be achieved, tonnage ratios 
should be substantially lower than those proposed by the United States, and 
there should be an express prohibition on ocean,going (as opposed to coastal) 
submarines whose primary use would be commer,ce destruction. This argument 
played well in the media and with the American public, which the British fully 
exploited. Over the next month the American delegation received over 
400,000 letters and telegrams urging abolition or drastic limitation of subma, 
rines, with only 4,000 supporting submarine retention. Notwithstanding assur, 
ances by the British that its proposals had neither unworthy nor selfish motives, 
but that it was acting solely "on the highest of humanitarian principles," and 
domestic pressure on the U.S. delegation to support the British proposals, 
agreement as to abolition or to tonnage limitations was not possible. Japan 
viewed its ability to build submarines in parity with the United States and 
Great Britain as one of its few successes at the Washington Conference.63 
It was at this moment that Elihu Root, former United States Senator, former 
Secretary of War and Secretary of State, and a member of the U.S. delegation, 
introduced the idea of regulating submarines as commerce destroyers. The 
Root resolution not only proposed new rules relating to visit and search, but 
also stipulated that the members of a submarine crew violating its provisions 
would be subject to international prosecution as pirates. 
The proposal met with almost as much opposition as the British argument 
for total abolition, not the least initially from the British delegation, which 
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feared its piracy provision would place its own submarine commanders and 
crews at risk.64 The French, Italian, and Japanese delegations, while agreeing 
with the resolution's aim, raised doubts as to its clarity and legal correctness. 
They suggested its referral to a committee of jurists for further study. This effort 
received an acid rejoinder from Root, declaring that neither he nor his resolu, 
tion would be "buried under a committee oflawyers."65 Continuing, he argued 
that the while the resolution might be ineffective "if made between diplomats 
or foreign offices or governments," he believed that if its rules "were adopted by 
the conference and met with the approval (as would surely be the case) of the 
great mass of the people, the power of the public opinion would enforce 
them."66 Efforts to clarify basic terms, such as "merchant ship," were firmly re, 
fused by the United States and Great Britain. After considerable debate, with 
slight modifications, the Root Resolution was adopted as the Submarine 
Treaty, as follows:67 
Resolutions proposed by Mr. Root 
I. The signatory powers, desiring to make 
more effective the rules adopted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neu-
trals and noncombatants at sea in time of 
war, declare that among those rules the fol-
lowing are to be deemed an established part 
of international law: 
The Submarine Treaty, Articles I,N 
Article I 
The signatory powers declare that among 
the rules adopted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and non-
combatants at sea in time of war, the follow-
ing are to be deemed an established part of 
international law: 
1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to (l)A merchant vessel must be ordered to 
stop for visit and search to determine its char- submit to visit and search to determine its 
acter before it can be captured. character before it can be seized. 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked A merchant vessel must not be attacked 
unless it refuses to stop for visit and search af- unless it refuses to submit to visit and search 
ter warning. 
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed 
unless the crew and passengers have been first 
placed in safety. 
after warning or to proceed as directed after 
seizure. 
A merchant vessel must not be de-
stroyed unless the crew and passengers have 
been first placed in safety. 
2. Belligerent submarines are not under any (2) Belligerent submarines are not under 
circumstances exempt from the universal any circumstances exempt from the universal 
rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot 
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with capture a merchant vessel in conformity with 
these rules the existing law of nations requires these rules the existing law of nations requires 
that it desist from attack and from capture it to desist from attack and from seizure and 
and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed to permit the the merchant vessel to proceed 
unmolested. unmolested. 
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The signatory powers invite the adherence 
of all other civilized powers to the foregoing 
statement of established law to the end that 
there may be clear public understanding 
throughout the world of the standards of con-
duct by which the public opinion of the world 
is to pass judgment upon future belligerents. 
II. The signatory powers recognize the prac-
tical impossibility of using submarines as com-
merce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neu-
trals and noncombatants, and to the end that 
the prohibition of such use shall be univer-
sally accepted as a part of the law of nations, 
they declare their assent to such prohibition 
and invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 
Article II 
The signatory powers invite all other civi-
lized powers to express their assent to the 
foregoing statement of established law so that 
there may be a clear public understanding 
throughout ti).e world of the standards of con-
duct by which the world public opinion is to 
pass judgment upon future belligerents. 
Article IV 
The signatory powers recognize the practi-
cal impossibility of using submarines as com-
merce destroyers without violating, as they 
were violated in the recent war of 1914-18, 
the requirements universally accepted by civi-
lized nations for the the protection of the 
lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to 
that end the prohibition of the use of subma-
rines as commerce destroyers shall be univer-
sally accepted as a part of the law of nations, 
they now accept that prohibition as hence-
forth binding as between themselves and they 
invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 
III. The signatory powers, desiring to insure Article III 
the enforcement of the humane rules de- The signatory powers, desiring to insure the 
clared by them with respect to the prohibition enforcement of the humane rules of existing 
of the use of submarines in warfare, further law declared by them with respect to attacks 
declare that any person in the service of any upon and the seizure and destruction of mer-
of the powers adopting these rules who shall chant ships, further declare that any person in 
violate any of the rules thus adopted, whether the service of any power who shall violate any 
or not such person is under orders of a gov- of those rules, whether or not such person is 
ernment superior, shall be liable to trial and under the orders of a government superior, 
punishment as if for an act of piracy, and may shall be deemed to have violated the laws of 
be brought to trial before the civil or military war and shall be liable to trial before the civil 
authorities of any such powers within the ju- or military authorities of any power within the 
risdiction of which he may be found. jurisdiction of which he may be found. 
In its re-worded form, the Root Resolution was adopted by the conference 
with an express stipulation demanded by Root that a forthcoming commission 
of jurists would not have authority to examine it.68 .lts survival was at risk from 
the outset.69 Its intent was to accomplish through ambiguous regulation what 
could not be achieved through express prohibition.70 It did not resolve issues 
raised in the recent war. The well-established legal distinction between com-
merce raiding and blockade, blurred by both sides during that conflict, was not 
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addressed. Efforts to clarify the term "merchant ship" with respect to the dis, 
tinction between unarmed neutral and armed belligerent merchant ships were 
blocked by Senator Root and vehemently opposed by the British delegation. 
Despite efforts to clarify this critical question by Italy and Japan-with France 
discreetly supporting but hiding behind each-the conferees, "in order to se, 
cure an outward appearance of agreement, studiedly evaded the real crux of 
the submarine problem; namely, the denial of merchant,ship privileges and im, 
munities to armed merchant vessels."71 
Ultimately, the 1922 Submarine Treaty would fail entry into force owing to 
France's refusal to ratify it.n Its problems had deeper roots: ambiguities in its 
most important terms and provisions, an imbalance between attacker and de, 
fender, a refusal to address the fundamental issue of the armed merchantmen, 
and a rush to reach agreement in response to the hysteria of popular demand 
rather than being based upon sound thinking}3 An analysis by a U.S. naval 
submarine officer writing before World War II offered these criticisms: 
It is difficult to escape the conviction that the delegates were still influenced by 
the "spirit of Versailles." No attempt was made to consider the submarine 
problem calmly and realistically. . . . Questions concerning the legality or 
practicability of the rules were ... swept aside. . .• [Ilt represents a solution of the 
submarine problem which is chiefly emotional and far too simple in view of the 
complexity of the considerations involved.74 
Of the treaties drafted at the Washington Conference, only the Submarine 
Treaty failed to gain the necessary support for entry into force. 
Another mistake of the Washington Naval Conference was the exclusion of 
Germany as a participant. For the moment an international pariah and not a 
naval power, Germany's participation nonetheless may have provided an op, 
portunity for a fuller, fairer consideration of the submarine issue. 
The view of Germany and the German people with regard to the U,boat was 
substantially different from that of the British and others who favored abolition 
of the submarine. As was the case with the airplane,75 the U,boat enjoyed pop' 
ular support in Germany throughout the years between World Wars I and 1176 
notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles prohibiting Germany 
from building or possessing either.77 Germany saw the value of the subma.-
rine,78 and was prepared to take the necessary steps to maintain its expertise in 
submarine design, development and construction. As was the case with mili, 
tary aircraft,79 Germany wasted no time following Versailles in commencing 
work to maintain and enhance its submarine expertise.80 
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Geneva Naval Conference. Submarines remained a secondary issue in the 
years following the Washington Naval Conference.' The major topic of 
international debate was cruiser strength, which was not resolved at 
Washington. Upon conclusion of that conference, Japan, Great Britain and the 
United States embarked on new cruiser construction programs.81 Britain and 
the United States, experiencing tension in naval matters with one another that 
began following World War I, did not keep apace with Japanese auxiliary 
construction.82 Under congressional pressure to stave off an arms race in 
auxiliaries (cruisers, destroyers, and submarines), on February 10, 1927, 
President Calvin Coolidge invited the leading naval powers to a new 
conference to seek resolution of that which could not be attained in 
Washington five years earlier.83 France and Italy declined, sending observers 
only, but Great Britain and Japan agreed to meet with the United States in 
Geneva. As early as 1923 the Japanese had anticipated that the United States 
would call for a second naval conference, and that its purpose would be to bring 
auxiliary vessels under the Washington treaty ratio. It viewed this with great 
disfavor and opposed it tenaciously.84 
Subsequently described as "one of the most dramatically unsuccessful inter~ 
national gatherings of the twentieth century,"85 the conference was in trouble 
from the start. The United States believed that Great Britain sought superiority 
rather than parity with respect to auxiliary vessels. Agreement among the par~ 
ties could not be reached for formulas as to numbers of cruisers, tonnage, or gun 
caliber (six~inch or eight~inch) due to fundamental differences with respect to 
national requirements. The Japanese refused to extend the 5:5:3 capital ship 
ratio to auxiliary vessels, reverting to insisting upon the 10: 10: 7 ratio it unsuc~ 
cessfully sought for capital ships at Washington.86 
While the conference ultimately faltered over cruiser strength issues, sub~ 
marine disarmament was considered. In preparation for the Geneva Confer~ 
ence, a U.S. Navy study reported that while submarines would be of an 
advantage in the event of war with Japan, the U.S. Navy was at a point of nu~ 
merical inferiOrity in submarines vis-a-vis Japan. The report concluded that 
submarines were "a vital element in any well-balanced fleet," and recom-
mended that the United States oppose the abolition of the submarine unless 
there was universal agreement. Agreement on means for controlling the sub-
marine race, such as displacement, maximum deck gun caliber,87 or total sub-
marine tonnage, could not be gained.88 No consideration was given to 
improvement of the unadopted 1922 Submarine Treaty or to other possible 
regulation of submarine use, perhaps due in part to France's refusal to partici~ 
pate fully in the conference.89 
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As was the case at the Washington Naval Conference, Germany was not in, 
vited to participate in the Geneva Naval Conference. It remained busily en, 
gaged in clandestine rearmament, including submarine development.9o 
London Naval Conference. Several events occurred between the 1927 Geneva 
Disarmament Conference and the 1930 London Naval Conference that would 
color the approach to the latter. On March 4, 1929, Herbert Hoover succeeded 
Calvin Coolidge as President. A Quaker, Hoover vowed to stop the naval arms 
race. Three months later the Labor Party took office in Great Britain. There 
followed informal discussions between the two new governments. On June 24, 
1929, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced acceptance of 
naval parity with the United States, canceling work on two 10,000,ton cruisers 
and three submarines. In subsequent Anglo,American talks, the United States 
agreed to parity with the British with regard to submarines, provided 
agreement could be reached with regard to cruisers. On October 7, 1929, the 
British extended invitations to France, Italy, Japan and the United States to 
participate in a conference on naval disarmament in London to address 
categories of ships not covered by the Washington Treaty. The invitation was 
accepted, though not entirely as the British had hoped, and the conference 
convened on January 21, 1930.91 
In many respects the parties were back to square one. The Washington 
Treaty's ten,year capital ship building holiday would expire at the end of 1931, 
and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States each were considering new 
battleship construction. The period was one of intense naval rivalry between 
France and Italy, while the former also was taking a number of steps to secure 
itself against the threat posed by the resurrection of Germany.92 The Ameri, 
cans and British, having begun the process of settling the differences that were 
the hallmark of their naval rivalry during the 1920s, proceeded with a mutual 
interest in continuing the provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty for ape, 
riod of five years, and extending its tonnage ratio to cruisers. As was true in 
Washington, delegation debates were heated, with Great Britain and the 
United States siding against Japan.93 
On February 11, 1930, the First Lord of the Admiralty offered British argu, 
ments for abolition of the submarine, which included "the general interests of 
humanity"; the fact that the submarine was primarily an offensive rather than 
defensive weapon (to counter a long,standing French argument to the con, 
trary);94 the contribution such a move would make towards disarmament and 
world peace; the financial relief that would be possible through its prohibition; 
and the arduous conditions under which submarine crews had to serve.95 He 
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suggested that if the assembled governments could not agree to abolish the sub, 
marine, efforts should be made to limit its size and numbers and to reconsider 
the rules set forth in the failed 1922 Submarine Treaty. In a reversal ofits previ, 
ous, long,standing position, the United States supported the British proposal 
for abolition.96 France, Italy, and Japan remained opposed to submarine 
abolition. 
Progress was made with respect to defining standard displacement, setting a 
limit on individual submarine displacement (a maximum of2,000 tons, with an 
allowance for existing submarines above that displacement),97 total tonnage 
(52,700 tons each for Great Britain, Japan, and the United States), and maxi, 
mum gun caliber (5.1 inch). Japan was successful in its insistence upon parity in 
submarines.98 
Failing a total submarine prohibition, which the British Admiralty did not 
believe possible, it offered for reconsideration in revised form the unadopted 
rules of the 1922 Submarine Treaty. One of the most contentious issues, how, 
ever, that of belligerent rights at sea in time of war-the British opposite to the 
long,standing American principle of freedom of the seas-was kept off the 
agenda at the insistence of the British political leadership, even though critical 
to resolution of the submarine regulation issue.99 Separate meetings of a com, 
mittee of jurists produced abbreviated but complementary rules to those con, 
tained in the 1922 Submarine Treaty. Article 22 of the 1930 London Naval 
Treaty stated: 
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law: 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must confonn to the 
rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether 
surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a 
merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's 
papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded 
as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in 
the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the 
presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board. 
The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to 
the above rules. 
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Gone were the piracy provisions. But in avoiding the differing British and 
American views, which in tum failed to consider issues such as the definition of 
merchant ship, the status of armed merchant ships,100 and the flying of false 
flags, the participants had not resolved the overall problem. The rules had 
been revised with the hope that French objections to ratification of the 1922 
Submarine Treaty could be overcome. But concern was expressed by British 
First Sea Lord Sir Charles E. Madden who, upon reading the revised rules, 
commented that "I am strongly in favor of supporting the French view [op~ 
posing the rules]. We will certainly wish one day to use submarines in a legiti~ 
mate way against commerce."IOI The official British naval historian was less 
charitable, concluding that "As it was plainly impossible for submarines and 
aircraft to conform to the Hague Conventions applicable to surface warships 
this now appears to be an example oflegalistic considerations obscuring prac~ 
tical realities."102 
The London Conference concluded on April 22, 1930, with a treaty oflim~ 
ited parties (only Great Britain, Japan and the United States) and of limited du~ 
ration (it expired December 31,1936, except for its rules regulating submarine 
warfare, which were without time restriction). The repetition in its submarine 
warfare rules of the failure of the Washington submarine treaty to clarify the 
ambiguities with respect to "merchant ship" doomed any chance of their suc~ 
cess.I03 Agreement as to many of the London Naval Treaty's key provisions 
came at what ultimately proved a very high price. Although Japan gained many 
of its demands, the agreement was roundly condemned by the Command Fac~ 
tion of the Imperial Navy, and was a factor in Japan's movement down the slip~ 
pery slope to World War II.104 
Germany, uninvited to the London Naval Conference, continued its prog~ 
ress in clandestine U~boat development. lOS 
World Disannament Conference. On February 2, 1932, after many years of 
preparatory sessions, the World Disarmament Conference convened in 
Geneva. The war clouds of World War II already were forming on the distant 
horizon. On September 18, 1931, Japanese and Chinese troops engaged in 
combat at Mukden. On January 28, 1932, only days before the Geneva 
disarmament conference, Japanese atrocities in its attack on Shanghai received 
worldwide media coverage.106 Its many issues are beyond the scope of this 
paper. It adjourned sine die on June 11, 1934, without alteration of the status 
quo with regard to submarines.107 
The failure of the World Disarmament Conference coincided with, or was 
immediately followed by, a number of events that reduced the likelihood of 
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further agreement with respect to submarines. On November 15, 1932, Ger, 
man authorities approved a plan for rebuilding the German Navy, to include 
construction of sixteen U,boats. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's assumption of 
the White House in January 1933 was followed almost immediately by the Na, 
tional Socialists assuming power in Germany. On January 16, 1933, the U.S. 
Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act, authorizing the Presi, 
dent to use its funds to bring the Navy up to London Naval Treaty limits. Funds 
were appropriated for thirty, two ships, including four submarines. On October 
13, 1933, the German leadership approved a new naval construction plan, au, 
thorizing larger U,boats while increasing construction of small U,boats to sLx 
per month. The following day, having been allowed to return to the community 
of nations, it withdrew from the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. 
Japan's 1933 withdrawal from the League of Nations was followed by its formal 
notice in December 29, 1934, ofits intention to withdraw from the 1922 Wash, 
ington and 1930 London naval treaties, effective December 31, 1936. On 
March 27, 1934, Congress passed the Vinson,Trammel Act, authOrizing the 
President to construct auxiliary naval tonnage adequate to bring the U.S. 
Navy, by 1942, up to the limits established by the Washington and London na, 
. val treaties. The twenty, eight submarines authorized were to be of the "maxi, 
mum effective tonnage ... that accords with Treaty provisions."108 On March 
16, 1935, German Fuhrer Adolph Hitler renounced the disarmament clauses 
of the Treaty of Versailles. In April 1935 Germany publicly disclosed its inten, 
tion to begin construction of submarines. Two months later Great Britain and 
Germany signed a naval agreement permitting Germany to possess a total ton' 
nage in combatant vessels, equal to thirty,five percent of the aggregate tonnage 
of the British Commonwealth. Germany also was entitled to construct for its 
use submarine tonnage equal to the total tonnage of the British Common, 
wealth, with the agreement that it would not exceed 45 percent of the Royal 
Navy's submarine tonnage. Noting British acquiescence to Germany's de, 
mands in the Anglo,German Naval Agreement, on October 3, 1935, Italian 
dictator Benito Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in open defiance of the League of 
Nations.109 This was the environment in which the second London Naval 
Conference convened on November 9,1935. 
Second London Naval Conference. Preparation for the anticipated follow,on 
London Naval Conference began one week after the end of the failed Geneva 
disarmament conference. The United States and Great Britain began meetings 
onJune 18, 1934, that continued intermittently through December. Meetings 
in London with Japan began on October 16, 1934. On October 24, Japan 
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proposed abandonment of the Washington Treaty's ratio, and defended 
submarines as a defensive weapon. An impasse between the japanese and 
Anglo,American positions was clear and, as previously noted, on january 29, 
1934-even before the London Naval Conference convened-japan 
announced its intention to rescind its obligations under the Washington and 
London naval treaties, effective December 31, 1936.110 
japan's announcement made the actual conference an anticlimax. japan in, 
sisted upon full parity with Great Britain and the United States, which each re, 
fused on january 16, 1936. In reaction, japan announced its withdrawal from 
the London Naval Conference, leaving the conferees with nothing more than 
an Article 22 of the 1930 naval treaty once that treaty's other arms control pro' 
visions expired on December 31, 1936.111 Article 22 was adopted as the 
Proces, Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV 
of the London Naval Treaty of 1930.112 
Post,London, 1936-1939 
The downward slide to World War II continued. The Sino,japanese War 
began on july 7, 1937, with combat between Chinese and japanese forces in 
North China. Two months later, the Imperial japanese Navy commenced a to' 
tal blockade of China. japanese attack on December 18, 1937, of the gunboat 
USS Panay on the Yangtze River prompted President Roosevelt to expand the 
Navy's strength. On March 31, 1938, in light of reports ofjapanese naval con' 
struction beyond treaty limits, the United States; Great Britain, and France 
agreed to employ the escalator clauses of the 1936 London agreement. On De' 
cember 12, 1938, Germany announced that it intended to increase its subma, 
rine tonnage to parity with Great Britain. Four months later, it abrogated the 
entire Anglo,German Naval Agreement.1l3 
There would be one more effort at regulating submarines. The Spanish Civil 
War began in july 1936. On August 13, 1937, Italian submarines supporting 
the Nationalist forces of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco began unrestricted 
submarine attacks of merchant shipping, prompting British antisubmarine re, 
sponses and a call for a conference to establish rules for submarine employ, 
ment. At the request of Great Britain and France, nations with Mediterranean 
frontiers, less Spain, along with Germany, Russia, and Great Britain, met in 
Nyon, Switzerland, between September 6th and 13th• Their meeting produced 
an agreement of the same name that refers to the rules contained in the 1936 
London Proces,Verbal, without any substantive modification or improvement. 
Their efforts were for naught, however, as the British were aware from their 
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interception of Italian signals that its submarine operations had been sus-
pended two days before the conference began. 1 14 
The state of play on the eve of World War II was less than perfect. The 
vague, unadopted submarine rules of the 1922 Washington Conference formed 
the basis for the improved but equally vague Article 22 of the 1930 London Na-
val Treaty and the 1936 Proces-Verbal. Although the latter ultimately was 
adopted by all of the major users of submarines in World War II, its ambiguity 
did not lend itself to a likelihood of success. It failed to distinguish between 
public and private belligerent vessels, or armed belligerent ships and neutral 
merchant ships. Other issues needed to be addressed, clarified and resolved, ei-
ther through a multilateral, bilateral or unilateral process. U.S. Navy officers, 
writing in the pages of the prestigious Naval Institute Proceedings, dissected the 
1922 Washington submarine treaty, Article 22 of the 1930 London Naval 
Agreement, and the 1936 London Proces-Verbal, and highlighted their short-
comings. IIS The parties to the negotiations between the wars chose purposeful 
ambiguity to reach agreement, however flawed; they drafted ambiguous rules 
as an alternative for a prohibition they sought but could not achieve. 
World War II: The Bloom Comes Off the Rose 
World War II began on September 1, 1939, with Germany's invasion of Po-
land. Two days later, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany.ll6 
Each major submarine user took different roads at a different pace to abandon-
ment of the rules contained in the 1936 London Proces-Verbal. 
Gennany. Initial orders to German U-boats were that they were to strictly 
observe the 1936 Proces-Verbal's rules for visit and search, with three 
exceptions: enemy troopships, that is, vessels known from intelligence or 
actually observed to be carrying troops or war materiel; vessels in convoy, or 
any vessel escorted by warships or aircraft; or vessels taking a direct part in 
enemy actions, or acting in direct support of enemy operations, including 
intelligence gathering. Although France had declared war on Germany, 
U-boat commanders were ordered to take no hostile action against French 
ships, including combatants, other than in self defense. 117 
History repeated itself early. Germany stumbled badly in World War I with 
the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, the ocean liner Arabic on August 
19, and the liner Hesperian on September 9. As previously indicated, the sink-
ing of the Lusitania and neutral vessels was a key factor in the U.S. decision to 
enter into the war against Germany.llB Aware of this risk, Hitler for political 
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reasons insisted upon strict compliance with the rules for submarine visit and 
search. But on September 3, 1939, the first U,boat sinking of World War II oc, 
curred when U,30 attacked and sank the British ocean liner Athenia (with a 
loss of 118 lives, including 28 Americans) when it was misidentified as a British 
auxiliary cruiser. Errors occur in war, but this error was compounded by the 
German decision to deny responsibility. 119 
The leading U,boat historian concludes that through the first seven months 
of the war, German U,boat commanders carried out their duties "in a fair-and 
at times even chivalrous-manner."120 Hitler's decision to comply strictly with 
the 1936 London submarine rules added significantly to the risk for U,boat 
commanders, while reducing their effectiveness. Within days the ambiguities 
in the language of the 1936 Proces,Verbal became apparent, as U,boat com, 
manders and the U,boat command sought clarifications or relaxation of Hit, 
ler's directive. The authority to attack belligerent merchant shipping was 
complicated by the knowledge that a ship might be using a false flag to conceal 
its identity, thereby forcing the U,boat to endeavor to visit and search, or might 
be a decoy shipP I On September 23, Admiral Karl Donitz sought a relaxation 
of the directive to permit attack of neutral vessels carrying contraband in the 
North Sea. Hitler approved changes and clarifications that permitted the at' 
tack or capture of any merchant ship that made use of its radio to send the 
"SSS" (submarine alarm) on being stopped by a U,boat for visit and search; au, 
thorized the attack of French shipping; and British or French passenger ships 
carrying 120 passengers or less. Hoping to avoid a repetition of the Athenia 
sinking, large passenger vessels were not to be attacked. The following day he 
authorized the attack of French warships; one week later the requirement to 
comply with the Proces, Verbal in the North Sea was withdrawn. But objections 
from Norway, Sweden and Denmark prompted Hitler to rescind that portion of 
his September 23rd order to the extent that it authorized the attack of neutral 
shipping. Two days later Hitler authorized the attack on sight and without 
warning of darkened ships (including neutral ships) encountered off the British 
and French coasts. I22 On October 4, the requirements for visit and search were 
extended to 15° west longitude; on October 17, U,boats were authorized to at' 
tack without warning any belligerent merchant ship; on October 19, the au, 
thority to attack blacked,out ships was extended to 20° west; and on 
November 12, Hitler authorized the attack on sight of any passenger vessel 
known or seen to be armed, and any tanker which was "beyond doubt" pro, 
ceeding to or from Great Britain or France. 123 By mid-1940, Germany's move, 
ment toward unrestricted submarine warfare was well underway.I24 
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Italy. On July 11, 1940, Italy entered the war as an ally of Germany, adding its 
105 submarines to Germany's strength. Italian Atlantic submarine operations 
commenced the following month. When operating in the Atlantic under the 
operational control of the German U,boat command, Italian submarines 
followed German rules of engagement.12S 
Great Britain. British progression toward abandonment of the submarine rules 
it worked so hard to achieve was slow but steady. Always the Cinderella of the 
Royal Navy, British thinking with respect to submarine employment suffered. 
Royal Navy submarines were so hindered by legal, moral and political 
restrictions, and bureaucratic impediments, especially poor training, that their 
first and only success in 1939 was not realized until December 12, 1939, when 
HMS Salmon sank U,36. 126 This was to change with the German invasion of 
Norway on April 9, 1940. Forced by the enemy aircraft threat to attempt to 
identify vessels through the submarine's periscope, many German troopships 
made their way to their destinations unscathed. The very neat rules of the 1936 
Proces, Verbal had run head on into the realities of war, and been found 
wanting. On April 9, 1940, the British Cabinet authorized the sinking on sight 
of all German ships, combatant vessel or merchant ship, in the Heligoland 
Bight, the Skagerrat and the Kattegat. The zone for executing such attacks was 
extended up the coast of Norway as far as Bergen three days later.127 On 
February 5, 1941, British submarines were authorized to attack on sight, 
without warning, all ships met south of 35 0 46' north on the assumption that 
they were German.128 In the Mediterranean, on July 15, 1940, British 
submarines were authorized to attack all vessels operating within thirty miles of 
the Italian coast. Two days later, this authority was extended to any vessel 
operating between Italy and Libya or within thirty miles of the Libyan coast. 
Subsequently, the Mediterranean "sink at sight" operational areas were 
extended as required.129 While the Royal Navy continued to place priority on 
attack of German Navy combatants, and British operational zones for 
unrestricted submarine warfare may not have been as extensive as Germany's, 
British practice was a renunciation of the ·1936 Proces, Verbal requirements. 130 
The British decision was taken for operational reasons rather than in response 
to German U,boat operations. 
Japan. Japanese abrogation of the 1936 Proces,verbal was immediate, 
coinciding with its December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. The 1,26 sank 
the merchant ship Cynthia Olsen several hundred miles west of Honolulu at 
0800, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was underway.l3l This was 
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followed by other attacks on merchant ships in the western Pacific, and a brief 
campaign along the u.s. west coast.132 While other merchant ship attacks 
followed, including extended campaigns in the Indian Ocean, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy's deployment of its submarines for the balance of the war did 
not serve it well. Former Japanese submarine officers and historians have been 
unanimous in their criticism of the failure ofjapan to give priority to the attack 
of merchant shipping.133 The evidence is clear, however, that prioritization of 
missions was an operational rather than a legal decision, and that Japan did not 
adhere to the rules set forth in the 1936 Proces~Verbal in its submarine 
operations. 
United States. On December 7, 1941, upon notification of the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, 
issued the following order: "Execute against Japan unrestricted air and 
submarine warfare.,,134 
Historians and international lawyers long held that the United States' ac~ 
tion was a reprisal for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 135 apparently based 
upon the statement by Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, USN, in response to inter~ 
rogatories from the International Military Tribunal on behalf of Admiral Karl 
Donitz. After acknowledging that the Chief of Naval Operations had ordered 
unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan on December 7,1941, Admiral 
Nimitz was asked if that decision was based upon reprisal. Admiral Nimitz 
responded: 
The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7 December 1941 
resulted from recognition of Japanese tactics revealed on that date. No further 
U.S. orders to submarines concerning tactics toward Japanese merchantmen 
throughout the war were based on reprisal .... 
The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the Chief of Naval 
Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified by the Japanese attacks on that 
date on U.S. bases, and on both armed and unarmed ships and nationals, without 
warning or declaration of war.l36 
These responses are postwar legal justifications for operational and political 
decisions taken before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They also are le~ 
gally inaccurate as a basis for reprisal. 137 
The decision of the United States to abandon its obligations under the 1936 
Proces~Verbal was premeditated, and not based upon reprisal. The historian 
who discovered the actual basis for the decision is quite specific: 
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The motives which impelled the United States ... to resort to unrestricted 
submarine warfare ... were the same which had activated Germany to the same 
tactic. They were coolly, studiously strategic: to cut off the enemy's vital overseas 
trade and thereby weaken his capacity to fight and win a long war. Submarines 
were the only American naval instrument which could reach across the Pacific at 
the beginning of the conflict, and they were promptly put to this prearranged 
task.138 
Revelation of the basis for the U.S. decision was protracted. Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, professor emeritus of diplomatic history at Yale University, pieced to' 
gether the story and offered a classified presentation to the faculty of the Naval 
War College on November 1, 1961. He returned to offer the presentation to 
Naval War College faculty and students on December 15 and discuss his paper 
further in a seminar the following day. Each was classified.139 Declassified in 
1978, the story emerged in 1984.140 Other pieces of the story were added by 
other historians.141 
The pre, World War II change in U.S. policy emerged rapidly. Following the 
1930 London Naval Conference, a new draft of the U.S. Navy's Instructions for 
the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare was received by 
the General Board of the NavyI42 on June 30, 1933. Incorporating the rules 
contaiI1ed in Article 22 0f the 1930 London treaty, it was shelved by the Gen, 
eral Board without ~doption.143 When war began in 1939, the Navy's \Var 
Plans Division prepared a revision. It was referred to the Judge Advocate Gen, 
eral of the Navy in April 1940 for comment and concurrence. The newest draft 
repeated the provisions of Article 22-now the 1936 Proces,verbal-without 
elaboration as to what constituted a "merchant ship," or possible bases (other 
than resistance to visit and search) for loss of protection. The questions raised 
publicly by U.S. Navy submarine officersI44 went unanswered. This document 
subsequently was adopted, published, and distributed to the fleet, but with the 
proviso that "In the event of emergency these instructions may be supple, 
men ted by additional instructions made necessary by circumstances then exist, 
ing."145 
The U.S. plan for war against Japan, War Plan Orange, long had recognized 
that Japan could be defeated through blockade.146As war clouds approached, 
the role of the submarine in accomplishing this mission received fresh atten, 
tion. In October 1940, Admiral J. O. Richardson, Commander of the U.S. 
Fleet, proposed long, range interdiction of Japanese commerce, recommending 
that were war to begin, U.S. submarines should "make an initial sweep ofjapa, 
nese merchantmen ... in the Pacific.1470n January 18, 1941, the commander 
of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas Hart, advised that ."the possibilities 
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in raids on Japan sea communications-meaning shipping other than naval 
forces-would be great if our submarines were free to wage 'unrestricted' 
war."148 
Others entered the deliberation process. On March 20, 1941, Admiral E. C. 
Kalbfus, President of the Naval War College, advised the Chief of Naval Oper, 
ations of the solution by its faculty and students to its annual international law 
problem, which assumed war with Japan. The solution acknowledged the law 
of war principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants, but ar, 
gued that "new weapons may well call for changes in the technique of applying 
fundamental procedures in altering some of the traditional procedures which 
no longer fit current needs." Noting the use of war zones in the European COl).' 
flict, it proposed similar zones-proclaimed as "strategic areas"-for the pur, 
pose of attacking Japanese merchant shipping, inasmuch as "visit and search by 
plane, submarine, or surface vessel cannot be readily or safely accom-
plished."149 
Admiral Kalbfus' letter was referred to the Navy General Board. Responding 
on May 15, 1941, the Chairman of the General Board rejected the Naval War 
College's recommendations, declaring "These [war] zones have no justification 
in international law, and the United States and other nations have vigorously 
protested the establishment of such zones." The response went on to conclude 
that "No change in this policy is considered at this time."ISO However, a memo, 
rand urn one week later advised that the issue was being addressed "in another 
manner."ISI 
The "other manner" involved steps being taken by the Chief of Naval Oper, 
ations (eNO). On May 26, 1941, the eNO approved Rainbow 5, the U.S. strate, 
gic war plan. Ten days earlier, the eNO had advised Admiral Ernest J. King, 
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, of his intention to transfer alllong,range 
submarines to the Pacific.1S2 By November 14, 1941, the eNO had drafted di, 
rections to the Commander, U.S. Asiatic Fleet for unrestricted submarine war, 
fare against Japan that matched the Naval War College's recommendations. 
Professor Bemis reported that he could find no evidence that the eNO con, 
suIted with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy in the preparation of these 
instructions. The new instructions were released on November 26, 1941, two 
weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, apparently after their dis, 
cussion between the eNO and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The 
eNO's action coincides with the rejection by Secretary of State Cordell Hull of 
the most recent Japanese demands, following which he declared that he "left 
the matter to the Army and the Navy."IS3 The eNO's instructions declared: 
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If formal war eventuates between the United States and Japan, "Instructions for 
the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare, May 
1941," will be placed in effect but will be supplemented by additional 
instructions, including authOrity to ... [Commander-in-Chef, Asiatic Fleet) to 
conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within 
that part of the Far East area lying south and west of a line joining Latitude 30 
North Longitude 122 East, and Latitude 7 North 140 East, which you will 
declare a strategical area ... .154 
The following day, a general war alert was sent to all naval commanders. 
When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, Admiral Stark spoke by 
telephone with President Roosevelt at 2:28 p.m. Washington time. Roosevelt 
directed Admiral Stark to execute the "agreed orders" to the Army and Navy 
for the event of an outbreak of war in the Pacific. Stark issued his order at 5:52 
p.m., Washington time, on December 7.155 The order to conduct unrestricted 
submarine warfare against Japan was not amended to include German and ital-
ian naval shipping when Germany and Italy declared war against the United 
States four days later.156 The first Japanese loss-merchant ship or combat-
ant-to a U.S. submarine was the 8,663-ton Atsutusan Maru, sunk by USS 
Swordfish (SS-193), on December 16, 1941.157 Japan merchant ship losses to 
U.S. submarines in the follOWing years would reach 1,150.5 ships for a total of 
4,859,634 tons, more than were sunk by naval aviation, U.S. and Allied air 
forces, mines, and surface ship actions combined. ISS 
There were various reasons for the U.S. decision. By the end of the 1930s, 
the United States was constructing and deploying fleet submarines with the 
range to reach Japan. This capability did not exist at the time of the Washing-
ton Naval Conference or London Naval Conference.I59 As indicated, attack of 
Japanese lines of communications was a long-standing part of U.S. war plans. 
To paraphrase an adage, the prospect of war wonderfully concentrates the 
mind. Issues raised by U.S. submarine officers in open source, professional mili-
tary journals during the 1920s and 1930s about the ambiguities of the 1922 
Root Resolution and Article 22 of the 1930 London Naval Treaty had to be 
faced by naval planners. As the semi-official U.S. submarine history concluded: 
[R) ealistic thinking demanded recognition ... that a nation's economic forces 
and its fighting forces bear the inseparable relationship of Siamese twins. Any 
reduction of a nation's economic resources weakens its war potential. Sever the 
commercial arteries of a maritime nation and its industrial heart must fail, while 
the war effort expires with it .... Armed or not ... merchantmen were in effect 
combatant ships ... .160 
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Other factors contributed to the u.s. decision. The practical arguments 
against submarine visit and search expressed by Winston Churchill 
twenty, eight years earlier undoubtedly were weighed, along with questions as 
to whether Japanese merchant ships would comply with a demand for visit and 
search by an enemy submarine. In his directives to his U,boat forces, Hitler's 
desire for compliance with the rules contained in the 1936 Proces,Verbal was 
not altruistic. He was concerned about damage to neutral shipping, including 
that of the United States, that might widen the war. The political risk for the 
United States was not as great as it had been for Germany. U.S. submarine 
forces would operate in an area virtually devoid of neutral shipping, and neutral 
entry into the war on the side of the Axis was unlikely.l61 The U.S. decision 
was not based on reprisal or retaliation, but was a conscious, deliberate decision 
made at the highest levels of the government to abandon flawed rules the gov, 
ernment had a hand in drafting eleven years earlier. 
If n a war that saw each and every major submarine power consciously aban, 
lldon the rules in the 1936 Proces,Verbal, it is an understatement to say that 
the treaty did not measure up to the harsh reality of war. Its postwar status has 
been debated, 162 as has the legality of exclusion zones by whatever euphemism 
they may be called. 163 Even the most ardent defenders of the Proces, Verbal pro, 
vide numerous clarifications and conditions identified by submarine officers 
before World War II but persistently ignored or dismissed by diplomats, negoti, 
ators, naval leaders and international lawyers of that era. 
History offers lessons. While the negotiation experience of one era may not 
transfer entirely to another, the reader is invited to consider analogies between 
the lessons from events described in these pages and recent negotiation efforts. 
1. Law of war treaties stringently regulating the use of a weapon system cannot be 
used as a substitute for an arms control agreement. Efforts to rigorously regulate 
submarine use as a substitute for its outright abolition, something which Great 
Britain sought but could not obtain, immediately jeopardized the future of the 
rules in Article 22 of the 1930 London Naval Treaty (repeated in the 1936 
Proces,verbal), while undermining the purposes of the law of war. 
2. The law of war may not be used to "cancel out" a threat to another nation's 
strengths, or for other purposes. The submarine presented a clear threat to British 
maritime superiority and, by the time of the 1930 London Naval Conference, 
to the United States in the Pacific. A law of war treaty was not an appropriate 
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basis for attempting to offset the threat. Nor was it a suitable way to balance the 
national budget. 
3. The likelihood that an effective, lawful weapon can be banned is limited. The 
history of the law of war is replete with unsuccessful efforts to ban weapons that 
have legitimate military value. The attempt to ban the submarine is one exam~ 
pIe. A respected expert of that era observed that no effective weapon has ever 
been banned. 164 The failure of the negotiators to acknowledge this did not au~ 
gur well for their efforts. 
4. If it is to succeed, a law of war provision must be balanced. It cannot favor the 
operational capabilities of a party to the conflict over another. The 1922 Submarine 
Treaty and its successors placed the submarine at an unreasonable disadvan~ 
tage, assuring failure of the rules, once conflict occurred. 
5. Beware those who proffer "humanitarian" arguments. No one party in law of 
war negotiations generally has a monopoly on humanitarian concerns. The 
"humanitarian card" was played against the submarine, because other argu~ 
ments against its use were unpersuasive. Concern for human life includes the 
lives of military personnel, not just civilians. 
6. The likelihood of success for a law of war treaty is in direct proportion to who 
participated in the negotiations and became a party to it, and why. The nation with 
the greatest experience with submarines, Germany, was excluded from each 
conference that considered prohibiting or regulating submarines. It is possible 
that more realistic rules might have been produced had Germany been in~ 
cluded. However, participation by every nation in law of war negotiations, in 
today's practice, does not necessarily increase the likelihood for success. The 
ability to understand an issue generally is in direct proportion to the time that 
has elapsed since a nation's military forces have been in combat. A nation may 
be willing to accept unrealistic rules if they are perceived as irrelevant to the 
nation's interests or to foreseeable threats to its security. Similarly, the recent 
practice of adopting new rules by majority vote, rather than consensus, mili~ 
tates against the likelihood of their long~term success. Likewise, the fact that 
there are a certain number of States Party to treaty x is oflittle relevance. A na~ 
tion may agree to the most benevolent rules in peacetime. The test is whether 
that nation is likely to follow those rules when it is involved in conflict, when its 
national security is directly threatened and its men and women are dying on 
the battlefield. 
7 . Treaties based primarily upon emotional appeal may offer shorHerm political 
gain, but have less chance oflong~term respect. The 1922 Submarine Treaty and 
its 1930 and 1936 successors were constructed in part in response to emotional 
rhetoric rather through dispassionate deliberation. Singling a weapon out for 
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description of its effects in horrific terms may play well with the media and 
cause some to succumb to emotional calls to ban that weapon. But war remains 
a violent confrontation between nations, and people suffer from the lawful use 
oflawful weapons. As evidenced by the efforts to prohibit the submarine, seek~ 
ing a political solution in response to emotional rhetoric often results in a fa~ 
tally flawed product. 
8. A difficult issue seldom becomes easier to resolve with time. The refusal of the 
United States and Great Britain to address the distinctions with regard to 
"merchant ships" merely postponed the inevitable. Using ambiguities to gain 
consensus did not resolve issues raised early in World War I that re~surfaced in 
World War II, prompting each submarine power to abrogate its obligations. 
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